INTRODUCTION
Victorian traffic law is a discrete and complex body of law governed by the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) and an overwhelming set of regulations. The law has grown over the decades to deal with new issues and problems associated with the use of motor vehicles. As the cars that are driven have become more complex and technologically advanced, so too has the law, arming law enforcement officers with the tools needed to licence and control the motoring public. Speeding and drink driving have often been topics focused on by the legislature and Parliament has tended to introduce tough laws and penalties in an attempt to combat the ever increasing road toll.
Driving While Disqualified or Suspended has been a motoring offence in Victoria for almost a century and carries one of the harshest penalties in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic). The offence itself is triable summarily and is contained within s 30:
(1)
A person must not drive a motor vehicle on a highway while the authorisation granted to him or her to do so under this Part is suspended or during a period of disqualification from obtaining such an authorisation. Penalty: For a first offence, 30 penalty units or imprisonment for 4 months; For a subsequent offence, imprisonment of not less than 1 month and not more than 2 years. (2) S 49 of the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply with respect to proceedings for an offence against sub-section (1).
The effect of the penalty section and sub-s 2 is that a person charged with a second or subsequent offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended must receive a sentence of imprisonment for at least one month. In effect, the sentencing provision carries a mandatory term of imprisonment for every person found guilty of a second or further breach of s 30.
Driving While Disqualified or Suspended is the only offence in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) to carry a mandatory term of imprisonment. 1 It is a harsh and draconian provision that is structurally inappropriate, offends against the principle of proportionality and results in substantive and procedural unfairness. Accordingly, one of the questions which this article has attempted to answer is why mandatory imprisonment has been used for this particular offence and whether its continued use can be justified.
Advances in technology in law enforcement have resulted in expanding administrative sanctions that were never anticipated by the legislature at the time of the introduction of the mandatory sentencing provision. It will be argued that the justifications (to the extent that they can be identified) for the harsh sentence in s 30 can no longer be sustained.
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF S 30 OF THE ROAD SAFETY ACT 1986 (VIC)
This section provides an overview of the major legislative reforms to the offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended provided for in s 30 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic). A number of significant amendments have been made to the section over the years, and presumably, these have been made to reflect changes in social attitudes to car offences. However, a search of the relevant parliamentary debates and other literature has failed to reveal any clear basis or rationale for the changes in policy. It seems that the major alterations to s 30 have been introduced as a result of government reactions to official reports or recommendations. While there has been fierce debate over other traffic law amendments, there has been a distinct lack of discussion or discourse in the parliamentary chambers regarding s 30. This is surprising, given that s 30 is the only Victorian traffic offence to carry a mandatory term of imprisonment.
A

Early History
Legislation relating to conventional motor vehicles was first introduced in Victoria in the Motor Car Act 1910 (Vic). Prior to this, the only Victorian legislation dealing with motor vehicles was the Victorian Railways Motor Car Act 1905 (Vic), which dealt with motor carriages or cars for passenger traffic. Section 6 of the Motor Car Act 1910 (Vic) set out an offence of driving unlicensed: 'no person shall drive a motor car upon any public highway without being licensed for that purpose'. Under s 8(3), suspended and disqualified licences had no effect, thereby rendering the holder legally unlicensed. No special penalty was provided for in either s 6 or s 8. However, under s 20, a person who acted in contravention of the Act was guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds. In the case of a second or subsequent conviction, the person was liable to a penalty not exceeding 25 pounds or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months. Importantly, the discretion was left to the court as to whether imprisonment should be imposed. The highest penalty listed in the 1910 Act was a penalty of 50 pounds.
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The Motor Car Act 1915 (Vic) retained s 6 and s 8(3) but introduced an amendment to s 20. In the case of a second or subsequent conviction, the court was given the discretion to imprison with or without hard labour for a term of not more than three months as an alternate to the monetary penalty.
The Motor Car Act 1928 (Vic) retained s 6 and s 8(3) and the penalty section was reproduced as s 25.
In 1949 the specific and distinct offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was inserted into the Motor Car Act 1928 (Vic). 3 Section 9(1) stated:
Any person who drives a motor car during the period of any suspension of his licence, or after his licence has been cancelled or during any period of disqualification for obtaining a licence shall be guilty of an offence.
The specific offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was inserted into the Act to assist police to detect and apprehend offenders who disobeyed court suspension or disqualification orders:
Clause 8 is new. It provides a penalty of imprisonment for driving a motor car during a period of disqualification, or after cancellation or during suspension of a licence, and gives power to arrest without warrant for any such offence. The police advise us that, although a licence may be cancelled or suspended, they experience difficulty in dealing with individuals who keep on driving. Apart from legal difficulty in proving suspension, there is further difficulty in collecting the penalty imposed. The offence is a serious one and it is considered that, where a person wilfully disobeys the order of the court, power to arrest should be given and the penalty of imprisonment provided.
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The section contained a penalty provision. For a first offence, the defendant was liable to be imprisoned for a maximum of one month and for second or subsequent offences, the defendant was liable to imprisonment for a minimum of one month and a maximum of three months. Although prima facie this seemed to be a mandatory sentencing provision, it is important to note that the court was able to fine an offender in lieu of imprisonment pursuant to the Justices Act 1915 (Vic) s 71, whether they were a first or subsequent offender.
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The offence and penalty were reproduced without amendment in the Motor Car Act 1951 (Vic) s 27(1) and subsequently in the Motor Car Act 1958 (Vic) s 28(1).
In 1961 a minor amendment was made pursuant to the Motor Car (Amendment) Act 1961 (Vic) s 8 to insert the words 'to drive a motor car' after the word 'licence' to emphasise that the offence related to licences to drive motor cars.
The penalty for a first offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was increased in 1963 to a maximum of three months imprisonment for a first offence and a minimum of one month and maximum of six months imprisonment for subsequent offences. 6 In his Second Reading Speech, the Minister indicated that there were 'grave dangers involved in persons driving their cars after their licence has been suspended' and indicated that increasing the penalty would deter drivers from making 'a mockery of one of the most important safety provisions existing in our law.' 7 Importantly, the discretion to fine first and subsequent offenders in lieu of imprisonment was still open to the court pursuant to the Justices Act 1958 (Vic) s 74(1).
B
The Introduction of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision
In 1967, s 28(3) was inserted into the Motor Car Act 1967 (Vic). 8 This had the effect of removing the discretion to fine in lieu of imprisonment for either a first or subsequent breach of s 28. As a result, the term of imprisonment for an offence 5 The Justices Act 1915 (Vic) s71 states:
Except where otherwise expressly enacted when a court of petty sessions has authority under this or under any other Act now or hereinafter in force to impose imprisonment for an offence punishable on summary conviction and has not authority to impose a penalty for that offence the court when adjudicating on such offence may notwithstanding if it thinks that the justice of the case will be better met by a penalty than by imprisonment impose a penalty of not more than Twenty-five pounds.
of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended became mandatory. The amendment was introduced as a result of a recommendation made by the Road Toll Committee:
In many instances, courts have imposed monetary penalties in lieu of terms of imprisonment by invoking the provisions of s 74 of the Justices Act 1958 which allows a court to impose a monetary penalty of not more than $200 if it thinks that the justice of the case will be better met by a penalty rather than by imprisonment. The committee is of the opinion, and the Government agrees, that a person charged with driving a motor vehicle during a period of suspension or disqualification or after cancellation of his licence should be in no doubt that, if convicted, he will not be given the opportunity of paying a fine.
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The Road Toll Committee was convened to make recommendations on how the road toll could be reduced. 10 The Committee was of the belief that the community 'expects the Courts to severely punish persons convicted of serious driving offences' and that 'if the details of penalties imposed for serious offences against road traffic laws were published in the daily press this would act as a deterrent to others'.
11 These beliefs led to a recommendation that 'Section 28(1) of the Act be amended to specifically exclude the operation of the provisions of S 74 of the Justices Act'.
12 At the time the amendment was made, suspended sentences were not available (discussed further below) and this meant that the defendant actually served the term of imprisonment that was imposed by the court. 13 This could be described as the high water mark of the history of mandatory imprisonment for the offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended.
In 1978, major changes were made to the penalty for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended.
14 Mandatory imprisonment for a first offence was removed and the court was given the discretion to impose either a penalty of not more than $1000 9 Rylah, above n 7, 714. 10 or imprisonment for a maximum of six months. For a second or subsequent offence, the penalty was changed to a minimum term of imprisonment of one month and not more than two years. At the time of the Second Reading Speech, the Minister distributed an Explanatory Paper which was not included in Hansard and it is not clear why the changes to the penalty were made. 15 It is reasonable to assume that the amendments were made due to protests regarding the severity of the previous sentencing provision.
In 1980 the scope of the offence was widened to include holders of suspended or disqualified motor vehicle learner's permits and motorcycle learner's permits. 16 No change to the penalty was made.
In 1982, the penalty for a first offence was reduced to 'not more than 20 penalty units or imprisonment for not more than four months'. 17 This amendment was introduced after a review was conducted of the penalties in the Motor Car Act 1958 (Vic). In his Second Reading Speech the Minister stated:
The review examined every offence in the Act and determined fresh penalties, largely independently of the historical bases which were originally established, to reflect the relative severity of the offences as perceived in the present day, to ensure that the amount of the monetary penalty is commensurate with the costs of prosecution, to relate the penalties for certain offences to the penalties prescribed for similar types of legislation …and to relate the imprisonment penalties…to the monetary penalties to achieve uniformity. and had never been consolidated. 19 The new Act was a major consolidation of Victorian road traffic law. Whilst it re-enacted the legislation, it was designed to be in a form which the average motorist could understand. 20 The offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was retained under s 30(1):
A person must not drive a motor vehicle on a highway while the authorisation [eg, driver's licence] granted to him or her to do so under this part is suspended or during a period of disqualification from obtaining such an authorisation.
The penalty for a first offence was increased to 30 penalty units or imprisonment for a maximum of four months. The justification for the increase was to eliminate anti-social behaviour, thereby ensuring 'safe, efficient and equitable road use'. 21 Interestingly, in an article discussing s 30, Bagaric and Edney have suggested that increasing penalty levels does not actually result in a reduction in crime.
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Increasing sentences/sanctions and the deterrent effect on target conduct is problematic and is discussed below. The penalty of a minimum of one month and a maximum of two years imprisonment for a subsequent offence did not change, and under s 30(2) the court was prevented from fining an offender in lieu of imprisonment: 23 Section 49 of the Sentencing Act 1991 does not apply with respect to proceedings for an offence against sub-s (1).
C
Recent Legislative Changes
The most recent amendment to the offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended was s 30A which was inserted into the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) in 2004:
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(1) This section applies if a person is found not guilty of an offence against section 30 on the grounds that he or she was not aware at the relevant time -(a) that his or her authorisation had been suspended; or (b) that he or she was disqualified from obtaining an authorisation. (2) The court hearing the matter may order that the person serve a period of suspension or disqualification that is in substitution for any of the period of suspension or disqualification that applied to the person at the relevant time during which the person was not aware of the suspension or disqualification. (3) The maximum period that the court may impose under sub-section (2) is a period equal to the period between -(a) when the person's authorisation was suspended, or when the period of disqualification started; and (b) when the person was made aware of the suspension or disqualification, or the period of suspension or disqualification ended, whichever is the earlier. (4) For the purposes of appeal or review, any period of suspension or disqualification imposed under sub-section (2) is to be treated as if it had been imposed for the same reason that the original period of suspension or disqualification was imposed.
This amendment gives the court the power to order that a defendant who has been successful in defending a charge of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended on the basis of an 'honest and reasonable belief', 25 serve a period of suspension or disqualification that is in substitution for the original period of suspension or disqualification. As a result, the 'successful' defendant can no longer be said to be completely victorious. This amendment is important because it recognises the defence of 'honest and reasonable belief' but also ensures that the defendant serves out the original suspension or disqualification period.
It would be reasonable to hypothesise that this section has been inserted as a result of recognition by the government that drivers may be unaware that their licence has been interfered with. However, an examination of the relevant extrinsic material fails to support this contention. One would assume that such a significant amendment would have resulted in at least some discussion in Parliament. Surprisingly, in the Second Reading Speech and subsequent debates, no mention is made of the amending provision at all. The Minister merely stated 'the bill also 25 In order to successfully defend a charge of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended on the basis of 'an honest and reasonable belief', the defendant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she believed, and had reasonable grounds for believing, that he or she was licensed to drive at the time of the alleged offence: Kidd v Reeves [1972 All other State and Territory provisions retain a discretion to fine in lieu of 33 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s49(2)(b). 34 Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s49(1) states that if a person is found guilty of an offence the court may, subject to any specific provision relating to the offence, fine the offender in addition to or instead of any other sentence to which the offender may be liable. 35 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 653-654. 36 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s61(4)(a). 37 Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s18(1)(c). 38 A summary of all relevant comparative provisions is provided in Appendix A. 39 In the Northern Territory only drivers that are disqualified are subject to a 'mandatory' term of imprisonment; judicial officers are given the discretion in the sentencing provision to either fine or imprison suspended drivers: imprisonment. 40 Examining the Western Australian, South Australian and Northern Territory provisions, it seems that they are even more severe than Victoria's provision, as all of these jurisdictions specify a term of imprisonment for first offenders. 41 However, none of these provisions specify a minimum period of imprisonment and the court has a discretion to fix an alternative penalty. 42 In all three States, where a term of imprisonment is imposed, it may be suspended (See below for more discussion about 'suspended sentences'). 43 In reality, the only State to mandate imprisonment for 'Driving While Disqualified or Suspended' is Victoria.
It is important to note that the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania allow a person that has been either suspended or disqualified from driving a motor vehicle to apply to the court for a 'restricted' or 'extraordinary' driver's licence. 44 If granted, the restricted or extraordinary licence allows the person to continue driving in certain circumstances. For example, a tradesperson may be granted a restricted licence allowing him or her to drive a motor vehicle for the purposes of carrying on his or her trade between the hours of 7am and 6pm on weekdays. The legislation allows the court to impose any restrictions that it considers necessary in the circumstances. 45 At present, restricted or extraordinary licences are not available in Victoria.
III DISQUALIFICATION/SUSPENSION MECHANISMS
There are many mechanisms which give the courts and other authorities the ability to interfere with a driver's licence. These include legislative provisions which a subscribe a mandatory period of licence disqualification or suspension and legislative provisions which give authorising officers and courts a discretion to 50 and an authorised officer of a public authority may issue an infringement notice where the offence occurs on land or premises under the control of the public authority.
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In some circumstances the issuing officer must suspend a driver's licence or disqualify a person from obtaining a licence or permit. Whether the licence is suspended or disqualified will be determined by objective statutory criteria. For example: 46 A suspended licence is a licence that has no effect during the period of suspension but automatically resumes validity at the end of the suspension period: See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s28A. The suspended driver is treated as disqualified from driving during the period of suspension, however, once the suspension period is over, the person may resume driving without having to make an application to the court or the Roads Corporation. A disqualified driver is usually a driver who has had his/her licence or permit cancelled and who is prohibited from applying for any licence or permit during the period of disqualification: See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s28B; Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 201. Once the period of disqualification has expired, the driver is unlicensed and must apply to the court or to the Roads Corporation to have his/her licence renewed: for example, see Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss50(3)-(6). 47 Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (Nygh & Butt ed, 1999) 282. 48 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss77(2) & 88(1). 49 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s77(2)(da). 50 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 77(2)(ab)(i)-(ii). 51 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s77(2)(e).
(i)
Where a traffic infringement notice has been issued under s 89C of the Act for drink driving (under s 49 of the Act) the offending driver's licence will be disqualified for a minimum period of six months.
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(ii) Where a traffic infringement notice has been issued under s 89D of the Act for excessive speeding under Rule 20 of the Road Rules 1999 (Vic), the offending driver's licence will be suspended for a minimum of one month.
53
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Demerit Points
The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) makes provision for a Demerit Points Register and the Roads Corporation is responsible for recording demerit points incurred by drivers. 54 There are numerous traffic offences that incur demerit points. 55 Once a person has incurred a prescribed number of demerit points, the Roads Corporation must serve a notice informing the person that they have exceeded the prescribed limit. 56 Where a person does not elect to extend their demerit point period, the Roads Corporation must suspend the licence or permit for a prescribed period.
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Where a person elects to extend their demerit point period but subsequently incurs additional points, the Roads Corporation must suspend a licence or permit for a prescribed period.
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In addition, the Roads Corporation must suspend or cancel a person's licence or permit if the person has been disqualified from driving in another jurisdiction or the person's licence has been cancelled due to a judgment, order or decision made under the law of that jurisdiction. 56 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3). See Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 302 for the prescribed particulars of a notice. The prescribed number of demerit points for a full licence holder is 12 or more points in a 3-year period: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3)(a). The prescribed number of demerit points for a learner permit or probationary licence holder is 5 or more points in one year or 12 or more points in any 3 year period: Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3)(b). 57 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3D). 58 See Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s25(3B). 59 Road Safety (Drivers) Regulations 1999 (Vic) reg 303(2). It is not known what factors will be taken into account by the Corporation in determining whether to suspend or disqualify under this section as nothing is specified in the Act or Regulations.
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Mandatory Suspension or Disqualification by a Court
The court must either suspend a driver's licence or disqualify a person from obtaining a licence or permit in circumstances where a serious offence involving a motor vehicle has occurred. Whether the licence is suspended or disqualified and the length of the suspension or disqualification will be determined by the relevant statutory provision. Mandatory suspension or disqualification periods are attached to numerous offences.
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In addition to the mandatory provisions discussed above, the following legislation gives authorising officers and courts a discretion whether to interfere with drivers' licences by way of either suspension or disqualification in certain circumstances. . 61 The notice has the effect of immediately suspending the licence of the defendant until the charge has been determined. Although on its face the provision is discretionary, police policy states that where s 51 applies, the police officer must suspend the offending driver's licence 60 A list of these offences is provided in Appendix B. There were once a large number of offences relating to probationary drivers for which mandatory suspension was imposed by a court. 61 A notice can only be issued to persons in the following categories: charged with an offence where the blood or breath analysis is 0.15 or more for a full licence holder, charged with an offence where the blood or breath analysis is 0.07 or more for a probationary or learner driver, charged with refusing to undergo a preliminary breath test, charged with refusing or failing to stop at a preliminary breath testing station, charged with refusing to undergo a blood analysis test, charged with refusing to supply a blood sample, charged with driving under the influence of a drug, charged with refusing to undergo or comply with a drug impairment assessment, charged with refusing to give a blood or urine sample after undergoing a drug impairment assessment or where the person has been previously found guilty or convicted of an offence involving alcohol. See further Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) ss51(a), (b), (c), 51(1A) and 51(1B 68 The consequence of this is that a driver incurring a suspension or disqualification by way of a traffic infringement or Roads Corporation notice may not receive the notice at all and may continue to drive due to lack of awareness.
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Suspension or Disqualification via Court Process
It is also possible for a driver's licence to be suspended or disqualified by a court in the absence of the defendant. Most of the traffic offences discussed above are triable summarily and, as such, will usually be dealt with in the Magistrates' Court • By post addressed to the person at their last known place of residence or business.
The police informant issuing and serving the charge has the option of serving on the defendant a brief of evidence setting out all of the evidence that the police will utilise to prove the charge. 72 A brief of evidence is served in the same manner as a charge and summons. 73 This is significant because where a defendant does not appear in court to answer a charge and the court is satisfied that the charge and brief of evidence have been served in the prescribed manner, the evidence contained in the brief will be admissible and the court may determine the charge and sentence the defendant in his or her absence. 74 This is commonly known as an ex parte hearing. The Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic) also sets out a procedure whereby the court may determine a charge by accepting sworn oral evidence from the police informant in the defendant's absence. 75 This is also known as an ex parte hearing. A driver who fails to attend court to answer a summons may thus have had his or her licence disqualified or suspended ex parte and may continue to drive due to lack of awareness. Even in circumstances where the driver knew that he or she had lost their licence, it is extremely likely that the driver was not aware of the penalty for a breach of s 30 (discussed further below). 76 If the defendant is convicted of a suspending or disqualifying offence pursuant to an ex parte hearing, the defendant may apply to the court to have the matter re-heard. 77 The defendant will be automatically entitled to a re-hearing where the charge sheet was served by post and the court is satisfied that the defendant was not aware of the charge prior to the hearing. 78 Where the defendant does attend court to answer the charge, he or she will have the choice of entering a plea of guilty or not guilty. 79 In both situations, where the charge is proven the defendant will usually be present in court to hear the sentence imposed. In these circumstances it will extremely difficult for a defendant to prove at a subsequent hearing that he or she was not aware that their licence was suspended or disqualified.
IV THE SENTENCE
As outlined previously, the penalty for a second or subsequent offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended is a mandatory term of imprisonment for not less than one month and not more than two years. 80 However, this does not necessarily mean that the defendant will automatically be incarcerated. The order made by the court must be a 'custodial order', that is, a direction 'that the offender be held in the custody of the State'.
81 'Custody' in this sense is different from incarceration or confinement, in that the order of the court will define 'the period during which the State may intervene in the individual's daily life' within society. 82 The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides for a number of alternative custodial orders, allowing for different degrees of physical restraint and control over an offender. 83 These will be examined below. Hence, the judicial officer will often choose one of the other options below.
Combined Custody and Treatment Order
A court that is considering imposing a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 12 months may make a Combined Custody and Treatment Order (CCTO) if it is satisfied that there is a causal link between the offender's drunkenness or drug addiction and the commission of the offence. 91 The order cannot be made without the judicial officer having received a drug and alcohol assessment report. 92 Where such an order is made, the defendant serves six months in custody, and the balance of the sentence is served within the community under close supervision while undergoing treatment for alcohol or drugs. 93 If at any time during the operation of the order, the offender commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the court must order the offender to serve in custody the whole part of the order that was to be served in the community unless exceptional circumstances exist. 94 In addition, the order may be confirmed or the offender may be returned to custody if he or she fails to comply with any of the conditions of the order. 95 A breach of a CCTO is a separate offence under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 96 Combined custody and treatment orders were specifically introduced to assist in sentencing offenders who suffer from alcohol or drug addiction. 97 Such orders are treated as more severe than Intensive Corrections Orders (see below) and judicial officers are precluded from imposing a CCTO unless the relevant purposes of the punishment cannot be achieved by an Intensive Corrections Order or a Drug Treatment Order (see below). 98 No statistical data on the number of combined custody and treatment orders handed down to s 30 offenders is available at this time 3
Intensive Correction Order
An Intensive Correction Order (ICO) allows an offender to discharge a sentence of imprisonment of up to 12 months wholly by service in the community under close supervision while engaging in unpaid community work and other rehabilitative programs. 99 It is effectively a prison sentence served in the community. 100 If at any time during the operation of the order, the offender commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the court must cancel the order and commit the offender to prison for the unexpired portion unless exceptional circumstances exist. 101 The order may be varied, confirmed or cancelled if the offender fails to comply with any of the terms of the order. 102 A breach of an ICO is a separate offence under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 103 According to Richards, the ICO 'is the highest level sanction available that still avoids the disruptive effects of immediate imprisonment on the offender and his or her family'. 104 No statistical data on the number of intensive correction orders handed down to s 30 offenders is available at this time, however, it is likely that this penalty is less popular than a suspended sentence, given that the conditions of an intensive correction order are often onerous. The ICO is considered to be a harsher penalty than a suspended sentence (see below) due to its position above the suspended sentence in the hierarchical listing of sentencing options found in s 7 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 105 
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Suspended Sentence of Imprisonment A suspended sentence is a sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person that is not activated. 106 Under s 27 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), a judicial officer may impose a sentence of imprisonment and then order that the sentence be suspended in whole for a specified period (eg, the offender does not serve any time in gaol) or in part (eg, the offender serves part of the sentence in gaol and is then released -the rest of the gaol term is held in suspense for a specified period). 107 The maximum period that the sentence may be suspended for in the Magistrates' Court is two years. 108 If at any time during the period of suspension, the offender commits another offence punishable by imprisonment, the court must restore the sentence and order the offender to serve it unless exceptional circumstances exist. 109 A breach of a suspended sentence order is a separate offence under the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). 110 The courts have insisted that the suspended sentence must be regarded as a sentence of imprisonment, and is a very significant punishment rather than a soft option. 111 
In Elliot v Harris (No 2)
112 Bray CJ remarked:
[F]ar from being no punishment at all, a suspended sentence is a sentence of imprisonment with all the consequences such a sentence involves on the defendant's record…and it is one which can be called…into effect on the slightest breach of [its] terms…during its currency. A liability…to serve an automatic term of imprisonment as a consequence of any proved misbehaviour in the legal sense, no matter how slight, can hardly be described as no punishment.
The overwhelming majority of second and subsequent offenders who drive while disqualified or suspended receive suspended terms of imprisonment and it has been suggested that this as a direct result of the mandatory imprisonment requirement in s 30. 113 In the Magistrates' Court of Victoria in 2003-2004, the most common offences for which a suspended sentence was imposed was for Driving While Disqualified (14 per cent) and Driving While Suspended (11 per cent): a total of 25 per cent of all orders imposing suspended sentences. 114 The next highest category of offence for which a suspended sentence was handed down was for 'Shopstealing' (9.6 per cent). Bagaric and Edney have suggested that by imposing suspended sentences for breaches of s 30 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), the courts are remaining formally but not substantively true to the edict of Parliament. 118 According to Fox and Freiberg, the guidelines in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) make it clear that suspended sentences are preferred over other custodial orders. 119 
5
Further Interference with the Offender's Driver's Licence
As already outlined above, any Victorian court has a general discretionary power to suspend or cancel a driver's licence under s 28(2) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) where that person is found guilty of any summary or indictable offence where the driving of a motor vehicle is 'substantially tied to the offence in question'. 120 In addition to the actual custodial order, this section gives the court discretion to further suspend a driver's licence or disqualify a person from obtaining a licence or permit where they have committed an offence of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended. Therefore a person in breach of s 30 could receive a term of imprisonment coupled with a further loss of licence.
V ABOLISH THE MANDATORY SENTENCING PROVISION?
The words of King CJ in Yardley v Betts (1979) 22 SASR 108 are particularly relevant with respect to the imprisonment of offenders for breaches of s 30:
a term of imprisonment may turn a usefully employed person into a frustrated unemployed person, may deprive the offender of the best and most stabilising influences of his life by disrupting a good family situation, and may increase a propensity to crime by placing him in the company of criminals.
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A second or subsequent breach of s 30 is simply a summary traffic offence, yet the provision carries the harshest penalty that the State has the capacity to inflict. As Bagaric and Edney point out, it is possible for people convicted of serious offences such as manslaughter, armed robbery or aggravated burglary to escape imprisonment, yet a second or subsequent offender driving on the road 118 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 11. 119 Fox and Freiberg, above n 28, 682. See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 5(4),7(a),7(ab), 7(b) and 7(c). 120 while suspended or disqualified must be sentenced to imprisonment. 122 Is there any justification for retaining such a harsh sentencing provision? It is strongly argued that if there ever was any justification for the mandatory sentencing provision, there is no longer any valid reason for imprisoning citizens for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended.
VI ARGUMENTS FOR REFORM OF S 30 OF THE ROAD SAFETY ACT 1986 (VIC)
A
Violation of Proportionality Principle
The underlying principle of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) is the principle of proportionality, that is, judicial officers should impose a sentence that is proportionate or appropriate to the offence. 123 In the famous High Court decision of Veen v R (No 2), the majority stated:
The principle of proportionality is now firmly established in this country. It was the unanimous view of the court in Veen (No 1) that a sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime in order merely to extend the period of protection of society from the risk of recidivism on the part of the offender.
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It has been argued that the decision of Veen (No 2) went as far as pronouncing the principle of proportionality as the primary aim in sentencing in Australia. 125 The mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 violates the proportionality principle because the punishment far outweighs the objective seriousness of the offence.
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According to Bagaric and Edney, the direct consequences of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended causes no harm to others and 'does not relate to any issue of public safety', 127 yet judicial officers are precluded from taking into account the particular mitigating personal circumstances of each individual case, other than to determine the length of imprisonment to be imposed. Sentencers are forced to apply a harsh and unrelenting sentencing provision to a number of 122 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 7. 125 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 9. 126 Ibid. However, this does not mean that imprisonment will never be appropriate. There may be rare circumstances in which a judicial officer in his or her discretion may decide to impose imprisonment for a breach of s 30. 127 Ibid 10. different offending circumstances, the result being that 'unequal offenders' could receive the same sentence. 128 Mandatory sentencing has been described as 'facially neutral' in that it allows 'for no differentiation or prejudice according to race, sex or age'. 129 In practice, however, the mandatory sentence in s 30 can impact disproportionately on those that use their motor vehicle often, particularly in the course of their work. Ordinary citizens that require the use of their vehicle in order to maintain employment face a choice between driving in breach of s 30 and loss of income for the duration of the suspension or disqualification period and perhaps beyond.
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The mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 does not allow judicial officers to make allowances for the particular circumstances associated with the breach in question, and it is argued that 'just sentencing requires an assessment of the special circumstances of each case that only a judge is in a position to make.'
131
B
Lack of Clear Basis or Rationale Underlying the Provision
Earlier it was shown that there has not been any clear basis or rationale for the changes made over the years to the sentencing provision in s 30. The legislature has tended to make broad statements about 'contempt', 'danger' and 'deterrence'. It is likely that the changes made to the provision have been made in response to community pressure and expectations. wilfully disobeyed an order of the court. 132 This rationale may have been justified at that time, as the only manner in which a driver could have his or her licence interfered with was by order of a court. As has been shown in earlier, there are a number of administrative processes that are now available to either suspend or disqualify a driver, either with or without his or her knowledge. 'Contempt of court' can no longer be relied upon as a legitimate reason for the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30, given the variety of ways in which the defendant may have his or her licence interfered with.
2
Grave Danger
The rationale for the increase in penalty to the provision in 1963 was that there were 'grave dangers involved in persons driving their cars after their licence has been suspended'. 133 However, Driving While Disqualified or Suspended per se causes no harm or threat to other road users or members of the public, and the course of conduct that makes up the offence is simply the act of driving on a highway without the appropriate authorisation.
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3 Deterrence
The legislature in 1963 indicated that by increasing the penalty for s 30 it would 'deter drivers'. 135 Later, in 1967 the legislature relied upon a Road Toll Committee report that was of the belief that publishing the details of serious penalties imposed for s 30 breaches in the daily press would also bring about general deterrence. 136 In 1986, the justification for the increase in penalty was to eliminate anti-social behaviour.
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In reality, the harsh sentencing provision has not deterred people from continuing to offend against s 30. As the table below shows, breaches of s 30 are continuing to rise significantly. There is no doubt that the growing reliance on administrative processes to detect and punish motoring offenders presents problems for the criminal justice system in terms of due process and procedural fairness.
5
Lack of Procedural Fairness
Due to administrative processes and court ex parte procedures, it is possible for a person to be convicted or found guilty of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended without ever having attended court. Recent amendments made to s 30 via s 30A of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) tend to acknowledge that the legislature is aware that people may be driving without knowing that they are breaching s 30. The question arises as to whether it is fair to continue to allow a sentencing provision that obliges sentencers to impose a custodial order against a defendant even when that person had no real knowledge that such a sentence would be imposed.
Fair procedure is essential in the criminal justice process. 147 It is 'relevant to preserving the cooperation and goodwill of the public in law enforcement matters.'
148 According to American studies, crucial elements of procedural fairness include neutrality of the decision-maker, polite treatment of the defendant and respect for the defendant's rights. 149 An opportunity for the defendant to state his or her case is also important. 150 Fox has highlighted that administrative sanctions such as the infringement notice system do 'not allow for the individualisation of treatment, the calling of criminal records, or differential penalties.'
151 He argues that: 146 It is conceded that some other factors such as an increase in the population, an increase in proactive policing or an increase in police numbers. [Administrative sanctions] carry the risk that they will produce an inappropriate escalation of penalties without procedural protections normally regarded as essential and which, in aggregate, may produce levels of punishment which are far more onerous than a proportionate response would warrant.
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The Victorian infringement notice system is unfair in that it relies in part on vicarious liability: the owner of the motor vehicle is responsible for rebutting the presumption that he or she was the driver at the time of the alleged offence. 153 The system essentially holds people accountable for conduct for which they may have no moral culpability. According to Fox, few people elect to go to a Magistrates' Court for a hearing on liability and/ or penalty, even though infringement notices carry harsh sanctions such as demerit points, suspension and disqualification. 154 The administrative system may result in the person accumulating demerit points that they are not responsible for, and may ultimately lead to the suspension of their licence. Procedural unfairness is heightened by the fact that a demerit points suspension notice under s 25 of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) that is sent to the last known address registered with the Roads Corporation is prima facie taken to be served on the person. 155 Even where a defendant has been personally detected by police, the defendant may not be aware that he or she has received a penalty notice, a notice of suspension under s 51 or has been summoned to attend court, due to the fact that notices and summonses may be posted to the person's last known place of business or residence. 156 Some may argue that administrative procedural unfairness is eliminated by the process of re-hearings. 157 However, it is argued that where imprisonment is the ultimate sanction, procedural fairness should be built into related administrative enforcement processes, to ensure that the system is fair and just. Sentencing a defendant to a custodial sentence in circumstances where that person was not sufficiently aware of the consequences of Driving While Disqualified or Suspended is abhorrently unfair. 
VII SOLVING THE PROBLEM
B 'Last Resort' Reform
Given that the legislature has been extremely eager to imprison offenders for breaches of s 30 over the last nine decades, it is unlikely that the provision will be amended to return the discretion to judicial officers. Some thought has therefore been given to other alternatives. It is important to note that the author regards the following suggestions as 'last resort' options.
The following alternatives may return some legitimacy to the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30: 158 Freiberg, above n 97, 217. The proposed change that directly affects s 30 is the recommendation that the Intensive Corrections Order should cease to be a term of imprisonment. If the nature of the ICO is changed in this way it will not be available as a sentencing option under s 30. Freiberg made a total of 50 recommendations in the sentencing review: Ibid 4-21. 159 Bagaric and Edney, above n 22, 11.
1
Restricted Licences
One possible alternative is to introduce into Victorian traffic law 'restricted' or 'extraordinary' driver's licences. 160 If modelled on the other State and Territory provisions, such licences would need to be applied for via the court and granted by a judicial officer. The court would be able to impose any conditions on the licence considered necessary in the circumstances. When granting an application, the judicial officer would be obliged to inform the applicant of the consequences of driving outside the conditions of the licence. Driving outside the conditions of the licence would attract a charge under s 30 and all of the consequences attached to such a breach. The holder of a restricted or extraordinary licence would be precluded from later arguing that he or she was unaware of the consequences of driving outside the terms of the licence. In essence, the 'contempt of court' justification for the mandatory sentencing provision would return to s 30.
2
Reform the Procedure for Licence Interference
Another way to return justification to the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 would be to dramatically change the administrative procedures for suspending or disqualifying drivers' licences. Administrators could be precluded from interfering with drivers' licences, and instead would need to apply to the court for an order that the person's licence be suspended or disqualified. Such an order would not be able to be granted in the absence of the defendant, and the judicial officer would be obliged to inform the defendant of the consequences of breaching the order, in a similar manner to the restricted or extraordinary licence procedure outlined above. Some legitimacy would return to the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30, as the defendant would be informed by the court of the consequences of driving while disqualified or suspended. It is however unlikely that the legislature would remove the right of administrators to interfere with drivers' licences, given the growth in the infringement notice system and the inability of the courts to cope with such large numbers of offenders. 161 3
Abolish ex parte hearings on s 30
A final alternative would be to abolish ex parte hearings on s 30, thereby giving the court the ability to explain to the defendant the seriousness of further offending. However, this alternative would not be of much assistance if the administrative ways of interfering with licences remained in place. It is also unlikely that the courts would be able to cope with the increase in hearings that would be required if such an alternative were to be introduced.
VIII CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to discover why mandatory imprisonment has been used for s 30 and whether its continued use can be justified. An examination of the Parliamentary Debates and other extrinsic material has not revealed any clear rationale for the introduction of mandatory sentencing, although it is assumed that Parliament considered specific deterrence, general deterrence and retribution to be important. Research has shown that there are now numerous administrative mechanisms for licence interference which would not have been envisaged by the legislature in 1967 when the provision was introduced. Statistics have revealed that there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of people found guilty of breaching s 30 over the preceding few years and it is quite possible that this increase is due to the growth in the use of administrative mechanisms for licence interference. The author does acknowledge that there may be other factors to explain the increase: further research is required to ascertain the cause for the rise in offending and to find alternative ways in which offending could be reduced.
Research has also shown that it is possible to offend against s 30 without knowledge of the breach, giving rise to procedural fairness issues. Knowledge of the actual penalties for Driving While Disqualified or Suspended amongst motorists is also lacking.
In summary, the continued use of the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30 cannot be justified because:
• The provision violates the principle of proportionality contained in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); • The harsh sentencing regime has not deterred motorists from offending against s 30; • The rise in administrative ways of licence interference was never envisaged by the legislature when the provision was first introduced and gives rise to procedural fairness issues;
• A comparison with other offences contained in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) has revealed that the offence in s 30 is less serious but contains one of the harshest penalties. The mandatory sentencing provision is therefore structurally inappropriate.
It is strongly argued that the sentencing provision in s 30 should be abolished and the discretion to imprison should be returned to judicial officers. This view is supported by a recent Victorian sentencing review conducted by Freiberg for the State Government:
[T]he Review reaffirms a commitment to the common law principle of proportionality which it believes provides the appropriate foundation upon which sentencing should be built. This means, in effect, that sentences should be neither excessively severe nor excessively lenient. It does not mean, however, that each offence should carry with it a prescribed or predetermined level of punishment. For that reason it rejects mandatory or minimum penalties'.
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It is strongly argued that the government should adopt the reasoning of Freiberg and abolish the mandatory sentencing provision in s 30.
APPENDIX A: STATE AND TERRITORY COMPARATIVE PROVISIONS
